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The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots 
Realities in Cameroon: The 
Omnipresent, Overbearing and 
Contested Political Elite
Numvi Gwaibi
Abstract
Electoral periods in Cameroon involve an impressive mobilisation of human, 
material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches, 
door-to-door solicitations, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing 
etc. Electoral manipulation involves selective voter registration, tampering with the 
electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities 
is a group of people known locally as the political elite. These elites notably the head 
of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials etc. have been at the 
helm of the state since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grass-
roots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve 
of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. On occasion, the grassroots are 
able to see through the mirage, which often leaves some members of the political 
elite staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on events around the 2013 munici-
pal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I 
employed participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews 
among others to unearth and document the complex relationship between grass-
roots populations, party officials and other high-ranking members of the governing 
CPDM party during election periods in Cameroon.
Keywords: elections, campaigns, manipulation, political elite, grassroots populations
1. Introduction
“[E]lections entail the largest mobilization of the national population in a short 
time span and require the coordination of millions of individuals engaged in 
hundreds of different activities” ([1], p. 5).
The history of Cameroon is quite colourful. ‘Kamerun’ was a German protec-
torate from 1884 to 1919, then a League of Nations Mandate following the defeat 
of Germany in the First World War, and later a United Nations Trust Territory 
administered by Britain and France respectively [2, 3]. In 1961, the British and 
French sections of Cameroon were united under a Federal structure [4, 5]. In 1972 
the federation dissolved following a referendum and the country became known 
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as the United Republic of Cameroon, and in 1984 the name was changed yet again 
to the Republic of Cameroon [6–9].
Unlike some neighbouring states in the Central African sub-Region, post-
independence Cameroon enjoyed a relative measure of political stability [8]. 
Over the last decade however, a number of crises have shattered the myth often 
propagated by government officials and supporters of the ruling party about 
Cameroon being an ‘island of peace in tumultuous central Africa.’ Rising insecu-
rity around the Lake Chad basin coupled with an upsurge in cross-border attacks 
in Northern Cameroon by the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, as well as 
deadly cross-border incursions by rebels from neighbouring Central African 
Republic (CAR) in the East Region of the country has greatly undermined 
peace and security. Meanwhile, the on-going crisis situation in the two English 
speaking Regions1 which according to the International Crisis Group2 is gradu-
ally degenerating into a civil war has further undermined the country’s image 
as a safe and secure location. This crisis is a direct consequence of the country’s 
historical trajectory and the form of state that was adopted following unification 
in 1961.
The unitary approach to the nation-state was the predominant choice of African 
leaders in the decades following independence. According to ([10], p. 175); “inde-
pendent Africa chose simply to step into the shoes of departing European powers.” 
The unitary state was therefore a continuation of the colonial state’s nation-building 
agenda which was aimed at fusing disparate ethnic and regional groupings into a 
single entity. At the political level, there was a concerted drive towards one-party 
systems as the sole vehicle for expressing political diversity [11]. With hindsight, it 
is generally agreed that this approach to statehood “fostered authoritarianism at the 
expense of constitutionalism” ([12], p. 1). However, when single-party rule was no 
longer feasible, and in a bid to survive in office authoritarian rulers adopted multi-
party arrangements.
According to ([13], p. 2), “the early 1990s were a time of democratic opti-
mism”. Like most sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon was greatly impacted by 
the ‘democratic wind of change’ that swept across the African continent in the 
1990s [14]. Unlike the others, Cameroon did not descend into anarchy nor was 
the regime in place swept aside. Instead the regime headed by Cameroon’s second 
head of state, Paul Biya who succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo following the latter’s 
resignation in 1982 reluctantly conceded to the legalisation of political parties 
and the re-introduction of multiparty elections. ‘Pluralism heightened the politi-
cal stakes and reinvigorated electoral campaigns, in some cases transforming 
them into battlegrounds where a number of actors, including politicians, parties, 
traditional authorities, and ordinary citizens, fought it out, nonetheless, employ-
ing every available means including cash, cults and culinary items to gain votes” 
([15], p. 2).
Electoral periods in Cameroon therefore involve an impressive mobilisation 
of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, 
speeches and door-to-door solicitations. Other activities include, distribution of 
food items and party paraphernalia, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box 
stuffing etc. At another level, electoral manipulation involves ‘gerrymandering,’ 
selective voter registration, tempering with the electoral roll and other administra-
tive manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally 
1The North-West and South West Regions of Cameroon erstwhile known as the British Southern 
Cameroons and today named Ambazonia by activists fighting for the restoration of its statehood.
2Source: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroons-anglophone-crisis- 
dialogue-remains-only-viable-solution
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as the political elite. The definition of political elite in the context of this chapter is 
limited to former and serving government officials (ministers, administrators etc.), 
national and local level politician’s businessmen and other stakeholders who belong 
to or are affiliated with the governing Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement 
(CPDM) party.
These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, gov-
ernment officials, and other politicians have been revolving around the state 
apparatus since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots 
populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of 
elections and disappear immediately thereafter. However, on occasion, the grass-
roots are able to see through the mirage which often leaves some members of the 
political elite licking their wounds and others staring into the abyss. This chapter 
is based on my experiences of events around the 2013 municipal and legislative 
elections in Mbankomo an administrative sub-division in the Centre Region of 
Cameroon. I employed a number of methods including participant observa-
tion, document and archival analysis, interviews etc. to unearth and document 
the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and 
other high ranking members of the governing CPDM during election periods in 
Cameroon.
2. Background
As noted in Section 1, this chapter is based on my experiences of the 2013 
municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of 
Cameroon. It all began in July 2013, when the president of Cameroon signed 
a decree convening the electoral corps. Article (I) stated that an election of 
Parliamentarians into the National Assembly and Councillors into Municipal 
Councils would take place on 30 September 2013. This announcement came at a 
time of renewed optimism in the electoral process following the introduction of 
biometric registration of voters on the electoral roll. On the one hand, it raised the 
hopes of many Cameroonians who were aspiring for meaningful political change 
via the ballot box. On the other hand, it set the ball rolling for a nationwide electoral 
contest that was full political machinations.
In the period leading up to the elections, I had exchanges with friends, 
conducted interviews and listened to media conversations and commentaries 
on the side-lines involving state officials, politicians and ordinary people. The 
general feeling was that with the advent of the biometric voting system, the 
electoral process in Cameroon might finally be credible. Many were hopeful that 
this system sounded the death knell for electoral fraud. People were very enthu-
siastic about the opportunity to effect real change, something that has eluded 
them for decades. Expectations of a free and fair election were espoused not only 
by members of the opposition, but also within the governing CPDM party. In 
fact some CPDM militants expressed optimism that the biometric voting system 
would definitively put an end to the negative image of the party as a vote rigging 
machine [16].
In the run-up to the elections, the chairman of the CPDM prescribed consensus 
as the method for selecting candidates. As will be discussed later on in this chap-
ter, reaching consensus in many parts of the country was a major challenge not 
least in Mbankomo where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork for my PhD. The 
main issue was that grassroots militants who expressed a wish to have certain 
candidates represent them in the municipality were brazenly thwarted by the 
party hierarchy.
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3. Conceptualising the electoral arena in Cameroon
“For all their structural reliance on ruling parties, electoral authoritarian regimes 
often show personalistic traits and become deeply identified with the person 
controlling the chief executive office” ([17], p. 246).
In Cameroon, key members of the governing elite including the head of state 
have been shuttling around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s 
[18]. The longevity of the Biya regime in power cannot be attributed to democratic 
credentials; rather it is linked to the ability to effectively subvert electoral rules. 
In fact, the government of Cameroon is renowned for having developed what is 
termed a ‘sophisticated rigging machinery’ that has ensured continued electoral 
success for the governing CPDM party in national and local elections since the 
1990s [9, 12, 18]. Other than the change of leadership in 1982, there has not been 
any fundamental alteration in the system of governance in place since independence 
and reunification in 1960 and 1961 respectively. Effectively, it is a one man show 
where everything boils down to the head of state. He is the president of the ruling 
party, the head of the executive, the judiciary, and legislative branches of govern-
ment; he is also the head of the army, police and other security services. The system 
is structured such that every action from the highest to the lowest echelons of the 
state apparatus is carried out on ‘the very high instructions of the head of state.’ 
Paradoxically, when things go wrong, everyone else but the head of state is blamed.
Meanwhile, the year 2018 is very important in the electoral calendar of 
Cameroon. A total of 4 elections are scheduled to take place, these include Senatorial, 
Municipal, Legislative and Presidential elections. Senatorial elections were held in 
March, 2018 for 70 out of 100 senators, the remaining 30 were appointed by the head 
of state. The governing CPDM party won 63 seats while the main opposition Social 
Democratic Front (SDF) party won 7 seats. Going by the results of the senatorial 
elections, and given that the CPDM party has won every election in the decades 
following the return to multiparty politics in Cameroon in the 1990s, there is every 
reason to believe that the party is bound to maintain its tight grip in power.
Having weathered the political liberalisation of the 1990s without a significant 
threat to its hegemony, the governing elite in Cameroon skilfully combined authori-
tarian methods and democratic practices to maintain political power. In fact, the 
present electoral system is skewed in favour of the governing CPDM party which 
very often enters the electoral arena as strong contenders with very high chances of 
emerging victorious. This is due largely to what many observers have described as 
‘electoral hold-up,’ specifically because the electoral timetable in Cameroon is the 
sole prerogative of the President who is often referred to by state media as the ‘sole 
master of the electoral calendar.’
The capacity of the electoral system to sustain the governing regime in 
Cameroon, and the quest by the government to maintain the status-quo makes it 
difficult to envisage any meaningful electoral reform that could lay the groundwork 
for free, fair, transparent and credible elections in the near future. Therefore, the 
electoral system in Cameroon could be described as a form of electoral authoritari-
anism whereby the ‘regime fills executive and legislative offices by elections, but the 
ruling party never loses elections’ ([13], p. 10). Electoral Authoritarianism in this 
context denotes a number of conditions, the first being that elections in Cameroon 
are broadly inclusive. In principle municipal, legislative and presidential elections 
are held regularly, under universal suffrage. The only exception being the Senatorial 
elections which as noted earlier is held under a two tier system i.e. indirect elections 
whereby 70% of senators are elected by municipal councillors and the remaining 
30% are appointed by the head of state.
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Secondly, elections in Cameroon are minimally pluralistic. Following the return 
to multipartism in the 1990s, opposition parties were allowed to openly compete for 
elective posts. However, in its design to fractionalise the opposition and weaken its 
strength, the government sponsored the formation of mushroom parties most of them 
allied to the governing CPDM. The result is the proliferation of opposition political 
parties numbering 3053 at the last count. Curiously, some of the mushroom political 
parties are made up of members of a nuclear family i.e. husband, wife and sometimes 
the children. The electoral system in Cameroon is therefore set-up such that the “hege-
monic party permit other parties to exist but only as second class licensed parties thus 
foreclosing the possibility of an electoral loss by the hegemonic party” ([19], p. 34).
Thirdly, the political landscape in Cameroon is minimally competitive, i.e. the 
horde of opposition parties, while denied victory, is allowed to win votes and seats. 
On the one hand, opposition parties have minuscule representation in the National 
Assembly, Senate and Municipal Councils; some councils are controlled by the oppo-
sition, some are shared with other political parties including the CPDM, but major-
ity of the Municipal Councils are controlled by the CPDM party. On the other hand, 
“by establishing multiparty elections for the highest office, Electoral Authoritarian 
regimes institute the concept of popular consent, even as they subvert it in practice” 
([13], p. 12). In 1992, the candidate of the main opposition SDF party John Fru Ndi 
is widely believed to have won the presidential elections, however, the results was 
declared in favour of the incumbent President Paul Biya by the Supreme Court.
Fourthly, the political system in Cameroon is minimally open i.e. the opposi-
tion is not subject to massive repression as was the case during autocratic rule. 
In fact citizens are actively courted by the governing and opposition parties for 
votes because they are viewed as the “arbiters of last instance in the electoral 
arena.” However, when things turn sour particularly when election results are 
contested, opposition parties and civil society in general regularly experience 
repressive treatment by the police and military who are used in selective and 
intermittent ways by government officials as “the arbiters of the last instance 
over the electoral arena” ([13], p. 19).
The notion of electoral authoritarianism as applied in the context of 
Cameroon therefore involves the claim that the regime of Paul Biya is ‘neither 
democratic nor democratising but plainly authoritarian albeit in ways that depart 
from the forms of authoritarian rule’ that obtained prior to the democratic 
wind of change in the 1990s [13, 20]. Unlike during authoritarianism where 
everything boiled down to one-man rule, power in the context of multipartism 
ideally involves redistribution among those with vested interests such as ‘politi-
cal parties and other interest groups. Multipartism also involves ‘institutionalised 
uncertainty’ and the presence of opposition parties that plays the role of ‘the 
conscience of the executive’ [21].
However, the financial, logistical and organisational limitations of the opposi-
tion in Cameroon prevent it from effectively challenging and defeating the govern-
ing CPDM through the ballot box. These and other shortcoming also inhibits the 
opposition from playing the role of ‘the conscience of the executive.’ On its part the 
executive in seeking to stamp-out any prospects of ‘institutional uncertainty’ in 
Cameroon governs the country through controlled multiparty elections whereby 
the CPDM party mobilises voters, and the state apparatus controls the elections. 
This Janus-faced action is designed to establish a pluralistic system that appears 
democratic on the surface, but is in reality is falling back to the one man-rule typical 
of authoritarian regimes.
3Source: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD). <http://minatd.cm/
index.php/en/en/annuaires/partis-politiques?view=partis> accessed July 2018.
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Despite its overwhelming dominance of the electoral arena in Cameroon, the 
governing CPDM party sometimes faces unprecedented internal challenges that 
threaten to tear it apart. The next section of this chapter will analyse a number 
of events that have occurred over the years between the political elite and grass-
roots militants. These events play out the vision of the chairman of the party and 
head of state to create a ‘strong democracy whereby the elite lead the masses’ 
[22]. Whereas actualising this ‘vision’ might have gone hitch-free during the 
monolithic era, it is proving to be much more challenging in the era of electoral 
authoritarianism.
4. Selection of candidates for the municipal and legislative elections
Following the official announcement of elections, the national president of the 
CPDM party issued a circular letter addressed to all militants in which he outlined 
the mode of selection of candidates to represent the party in the polls. The circular 
letter cited Article 23 of the constitution and basic texts of the party, which states 
that “the nomination of CPDM candidates for the parliamentary and municipal 
elections will revert to the Central Committee” [23].
The president’s instructions to party militants were not very different from what 
obtained during authoritarian rule. Then, the political elite did not fail to remind 
militants seeking elective posts that their ‘investiture’ was thanks to the magnanim-
ity of the party leadership and its illustrious leader, and not to their own efforts or 
the support of grassroots militants [18]. The circular goes on to state that selection 
by the central committee of the party will be done in conjunction with militants 
at the base, and will aim to encourage the emergence of honest and dynamic men, 
women and youths who can effectively convey to the grassroots the president’s 
vision of transforming Cameroon into an emerging country by the year 2035. The 
circular ended with a call for the selection of candidates to be conducted in a spirit 
of openness, political maturity, objectivity and the quest for consensus [23].
Consensus was therefore a key element in the strategy of the CPDM party 
to mobilise grassroots militants for the 2013 municipal and legislative elections. 
As is the norm, the party hierarchy dispatched teams throughout the country to 
oversee the ‘investiture’ process. These teams were divided into two; one in charge 
of the municipal elections and another in charge of the legislative elections. Each 
team included; a president, a vice president, a coordinator, a chargés des missions 
and members [23]. In the run-up to the elections there was a beehive of activities 
throughout the country by party officials, administrative authorities and grassroots 
militants aimed at cementing the dominance of the CPDM party in the electoral 
arena in Cameroon.
4.1 Pre-electoral manoeuvrings
According to electoral regulations in Cameroon, the convening of the electoral 
corps effectively puts an end to registration of voters on the electoral list. This also 
marks the start of overt and covert manoeuvres by political parties to select or elect 
candidates to compete for various posts. Whereas campaigning officially kicks off 2 
weeks before polling day, many observers felt the governing CPDM was already on 
the campaign trail as far back as 19th May 2011 [24].
In his traditional annual speech delivered on the eve of national day celebrated 
every 20th May, the head of state announced the issuing of national identity (ID) 
cards cost-free to all eligible Cameroonians. Similarly, he ordered the extension of 
the process a couple of months later in his usual end of year speech for 2012 [25]. 
The official reason advanced for this move was to accelerate the registration of 
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voters on the electoral lists, which was lagging ever since the process was announced 
in early 2011. In Cameroon, the ID card not only contains details (name, sex, date of 
birth, place of birth, etc.) of the bearer, but is essential for all official transactions. 
It is scrupulously controlled by security forces stationed along make-shift check-
points on roads throughout the country.
The ID card is also an essential document for voter registration. However, 
inscription into the electoral register has been on a steady decline in the decades 
following the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s. Voter apathy is largely 
blamed on electoral fraud and a general feeling among many Cameroonians that 
the electoral process is fundamentally flawed to the point where change cannot be 
effected via the ballot box. As noted earlier, the current regime is a prolongation of 
the autocratic system created by Ahidjo which his successor Paul Biya has skilfully 
adapted into a ‘democratic’ environment [26].
Over the years, many citizens have lost faith in the electoral system because it 
is perceived to be incapable of effecting genuine political renewal in Cameroon. 
The 1992 presidential election was therefore seen as the turning point when 
Cameroonians, according to ([27], p. 114), “were made to understand that democ-
racy is not necessarily having as president the person the majority wants.” This 
assessment is based on the widely held view that that election was won by the 
opposition SDF leader, John Fru Ndi, but declared in favour of the CPDM by the 
Supreme Court [28].
The then president of the Supreme Court was infamously associated with the 
phrase my hands are tied by the law. The inability of the Supreme Court to declare 
what many believed was the ‘right result’ i.e. the defeat of the incumbent head 
of state generated public uproar which degenerated into civil disobedience and 
violence for several years. The action by the Supreme Court of Cameroon not only 
bounded the fate of millions of Cameroonians to a regime that many people genu-
inely wanted out of power, but also strengthened the argument by ([29], p. 12), 
that “in the face of the global resurgence of democracy, [authoritarian regimes] 
are bending democracy into a strategy of power, using elections to disempower the 
people. And they are succeeding.”
On another note, the press widely reported how thousands of uncollected ID 
cards littered Police stations throughout the country. One newspaper reported how 
the Divisional Officer (DO) of Ebolowa II in the president’s home Region took it 
upon himself to tour villages in his administrative unit, personally handing out ID 
cards that had been abandoned in the South Regional capital, Ebolowa [30]. As the 
elections approached, other Divisional Officer’s shifted gear from distributing ID 
cards to distributing voter cards. In Mbankomo, barely weeks after his installation, 
I accompanied the Divisional Officer on the last leg of his tour of the subdivision. 
In his address to the population, the DO performed the role of civil administrator 
and party official. He called on CPDM militants to be united and vigilant, and to 
massively register and turn out in throve on polling day to vote for their party and 
President Paul Biya. His official delegation also included workers from the local 
branch of the election management body Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), and 
during each stopover their functions was to identify registered voters and hand out 
voter cards.
4.2 Meddling elite and discontented militants
State officials were not the only ones concerned about potential voter apathy. In 
a note addressed to party militants, the Secretary General of the CPDM appointed 
high-powered delegations of party bigwigs to the 10 regions of the country to 
sensitise and mobilise grassroots militants to collect voter cards [31]. This came 
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in the wake of a bruising investiture process in which many grassroots militants 
were enraged by the actions of some party bosses. The deployment of senior 
party officials to the field was not unusual. It is common practice during electoral 
periods in Cameroon for the public administration, i.e. ministerial departments 
and other public institutions to be emptied of high ranking bureaucrats. These 
public servants are deployed to their home regions and villages to campaign for 
the CPDM party. Dispatching such high level delegations on the eve of the 2013 
municipal-legislative elections came amid generalised paranoia among party hier-
archy over threats of widespread dissent and a possible party split. Despite official 
denials, it was hard to conceal the fact that these officials were sent out to persuade 
grassroots supporters enraged by what many perceived as treachery by elements 
of the political elite not to desert the party. Acrimony was so widespread that some 
loyal militants who lost out in the process not only pointed accusing fingers at 
party hierarchy but also expressed fears for the future of the party [16].
In Mbankomo, the outgoing Mayor sought the party endorsement to run for a 
second term, but his re-election bid was met with stiff opposition from another 
faction of the party that was favoured by the political elite. According to an infor-
mant and member of the outgoing Mayor’s team the delegation sent-out by the 
CPDM party hierarchy to conduct the investiture process in Mbankomo was biased 
in favour of the Mayors opponents and connived with them to frustrate his re-elec-
tion bid. As discussed below, the candidates list of the outgoing Mayor was thrown 
out in a rather ignominious manner. Despite this setback, my informant remained 
steadfast to the party and reaffirmed his undying loyalty to party president, Paul 
Biya. He however, expressed fears that enraged grassroots militants might trans-
form anger into negative votes which might cause the party to lose the elections in 
Mbankomo and other places around the country where other militants were equally 
aggrieved.4 These issues will be examined in greater details subsequently in the 
meantime I will examine how the investiture process played out in Mbankomo.
4.3 Contesting the party elite
On 11 July 2013, the CPDM central committee delegation responsible for the 
supervision of the investiture process in the Mefou and Akono Division descended 
on Mbankomo, where a meeting was scheduled in the municipal hall. This delega-
tion was based at the divisional headquarters in Ngoumou, whence they visited 
other towns in the area for similar purposes. Initially slated for 13:00 the meeting 
finally started around 15:00. The meeting began with presentation of the rules for 
the investiture of candidates by the party chairman Paul Biya. The militants present 
were cautioned that aspirants whose documents did not conform to the electoral 
code would be disqualified by ELECAM. They were also reminded that candidates 
would be selected via consensus lists, and the list will be forwarded to the party 
headquarters for approval. The militants present in the hall were asked not to pay 
the requisite caution fee of CFA 50.000 FRS, but to have the cash handy and wait 
for the appropriate moment [16].
Following this brief presentation, the floor was opened for questions and com-
ments. The first question from the audience sought clarification from the party del-
egates about who was authorised to sign the attestation of residence; this person was 
confused about the competent authority to legalise this document. One of the party 
delegates responded that under normal circumstances it was the responsibility of 
the legal department, but due to time constraints the signature of the Divisional 
Officer was sufficient. The next issue was the competent authority to legalise a 
4Personal communication 07/12/2013.
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birth certificate, the answer to that question was that it is the responsibility of the 
Mayor or civil status registrar of the person’s place of birth. This was confirmed by 
the outgoing Mayor who expressed his availability to sign birth certificates without 
delay [16].
Following the outgoing Mayors clarification, the head of the central commit-
tee delegation stated that their job was to collect the list of ruling party candidates 
aspiring to contest the municipal elections for Mbankomo council. He added that 
the party chairman had recommended investiture of candidates via consensus 
lists. He also stated that the most important part of the meeting was to select the 
25 members that will contest the municipal elections in Mbankomo on the CPDM 
party list. Another member of the central committee delegation stated that prior 
to their arrival in Mbankomo they were informed that preparatory meetings had 
taken place between different branches of the party (Youth, Women and Men) 
in Mbankomo [16]. These meetings were held in the presence of a party elite and 
former Minister, however, the stakeholders failed to come up with a consensus. As a 
result, three of the four list leaders agreed to fuse into one, but the outgoing Mayor 
declined to associate with them.
Following this remark, the chairman opened the floor for comments, ques-
tions and clarifications. The first hand that went up was that of the youth-wing 
or Y-CPDM president. He argued that not every local stakeholder was invited to 
the meetings at the former Minister’s residence and as a result it was unfair to hold 
decisions taken at that meeting to be representative of everyone’s opinions. He 
added that any consensus list should take into consideration the hard work of local 
CPDM youths who had made lots of sacrifices to represent the party at public events 
in Mbankomo, despite limited support from the political elite. The next person to 
take the floor was a man describing himself as a member of the local elite. He said 
the groundwork for the meeting was laid in the presence of everyone and that the 
statement by the Y-CPDM president was simply absurd. He added that everything 
had been sorted out and that the Y-CPDM president had to accept things the way 
they are. He then urged the Y-CPDM president to lay his political ambitions aside 
and join him to work for the unity of the party [16].
Responding to the controversy, the head of the central committee delegation 
stated that the party hierarchy sent them out to seek unity and solidarity among 
grassroots militants and to oversee the selection of 25 people who will continue the 
achievements of the outgoing team. He added that the central committee will have 
the final say about who is elected as councillor and will designate a Mayor among 
them, but for the moment the objective was to designate candidates that will form the 
consensus list. He also reminded the audience that Mbankomo Council requires 25 
not 50 councillors and that the numbers cannot be multiplied to suit personal ambi-
tions [16]. At that point, a suggestion was made that the contending list leaders select 
two people each to enter into a conclave and come up with a consensus list. Both sides 
accepted the suggestions and the meeting was suspended to reconvene at 18:00.
4.4 Intractable conclave: conversations on the sidelines
I returned to the venue at 18:00, but it seemed the ‘white smoke’ from the 
conclave that will signify ‘consensus’ between the factions vying for the CPDM 
candidates list for the municipal elections in Mbankomo was a long way off. While 
waiting for the contending parties to return, I struck-up conversations with some 
Y-CPDM militants who like me were watching the events unfold from the side-lines. 
The content of our conversations centred on the municipal and legislative elections 
in general and the reasons for the turmoil within the CPDM in Mbankomo and 
other places around the country.
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One of my interlocutors, Onana (pseudonym), started off by listing the two 
main criteria for choosing candidates for the party, i.e. election via party primaries 
or selection most often by consensus. In 2007, the CPDM party designated its 
candidates via party primaries; however, in 2013, it was done by consensus. As 
discussed later, the choice of consensus was designed to avoid a repetition of events 
of 2007 where prominent members of the political elite were rejected by grassroots 
militants in several constituencies around the country.
According to this contact, selection of the 25 candidates for the 2007 municipal 
elections on the CPDM ticket began at the base, during which each tribal grouping 
comes up with its quota of candidates to make up the sociological components of 
the area. According to Section 151 (3) of the electoral code, “each list shall take into 
consideration the various sociological components of the constituency concerned…”5  
However, this law is quite vague about the meaning of the term ‘sociological com-
ponents,’ leaving it to various interpretations. This hazy clause is often employed 
by electoral officials mainly as a justification for rejecting opposition party lists. 
Following the selection of candidates at the base, the list was forwarded to party 
headquarters, where it was discovered that names of many grassroots militants 
were removed, and replaced with the names of members of the political elite who 
mainly reside in the capital Yaoundé roughly 20 km away. This, according to Onana 
did not go down well with the grassroots militants and almost ‘led to a revolution in 
Mbankomo.’6
Many people were angry at what they perceived as deliberate undermining of 
their choice of candidates by the party hierarchy in favour of those who are merely 
seeking their selfish political gains. Moreover, he went on, these outsiders only 
think of the grassroots during election periods and, after securing their mandates, 
quickly scarper off and no-one hears from them until elections are approaching 
again. Frustrated by such disingenuous practices, grassroots militants in 2007 
decided to teach them a lesson during the party primaries.
Another interlocutor, Abogo (pseudonym), was frustrated that other councils 
in the area had already selected candidates, but Mbankomo always had problems 
because of meddling by the political elite. Pressed on the issue of meddling by the 
elites, he cited the furore that ensued following nationwide primaries held by the 
CPDM in the lead-up to the 2007 municipal elections. Back then, many prominent 
members of the CPDM party were humiliated and denied electoral franchise by 
grassroots militants. A notorious casualty of this revolt was the president of the 
National Assembly who in 2007 lost the party primaries in his local constituency 
in the Mayo Sava Division in the Extreme North of Cameroon, but was reinstated 
by the CPDM central committee. According to Abogo, the actions of the Central 
Committee greatly infuriated grassroots militants who viewed it as a blatant 
violation of their right to select credible people to represent them in key state and 
local institutions. He expressed fears that a similar action might be in the offing in 
Mbankomo.7
Unlike in 2007, Cameroon’s political calendar in 2013 featured munici-
pal, legislative and senatorial elections. The creation of the Senate in 2013 
wrought fundamental changes in the hierarchical order at the helm of the state. 
According to Article 6(4) of the constitution, the President of the Senate is next 
in line to fill the post of head of state, albeit temporarily in case of a vacancy 
for reasons of illness, death or resignation. Prior to the creation of the Senate in 
2013, the role of ‘constitutional successor’ was the preserve of the president of 
the National Assembly who in terms of state protocol was the second personality 
5Law No. 2012/001 of 19 April 2012, on the Electoral Code of Cameroon.
6Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.
7Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.
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of the state. This constitutional provision allows the individuals at the helm of 
the state during this delicate period to preside over the transition, but not put 
themselves up for election; however, they could prove to be a vital king-maker. 
With the advent of the Senate as the upper chamber of parliament, the role of 
temporary successor automatically shifted from the National Assembly to the 
Senate President [16].
Considering that he was rejected by grassroots militants in 2007 but forcefully 
reinstated by party hierarchy. The President of the National Assembly viewed the 
Senate as an opportunity to move away from direct dependence on grassroots mili-
tants and ‘universal suffrage’ for his political survival to an ‘electoral college’ made 
up of a selected number of municipal councillors. He also probably conjectured the 
opportunity of being appointed by the head of state into the Senate, because, as 
noted earlier, the latter has the constitutional prerogative to appoint 30 out of 100 
senators that make up the upper chamber of the Cameroon legislature. In a desper-
ate but ultimately futile attempt to maintain himself as the second personality of 
the State, ‘the MP from the Mayo Sava constituency sought to be a candidate for 
the Upper House. Unfortunately, his application was rejected by the CPDM party’s 
national nomination commission presided over by the party chairman President 
Paul Biya [32].’
It should be noted that in Cameroon, senators are voted by an electoral college 
that consists of Municipal Councillors. As a result, it is much easier for the political 
elite (as was observed during the 2013 and 2018 senatorial elections) to sway this 
select group of voters with financial and other material incentives to vote for them, 
than is the case with the mass of ordinary voters. In the months after the rejection 
of his senatorial bid, there was wild speculation that the president of the National 
Assembly whose mandate as parliamentarian was nearing its end was heading 
towards political oblivion. However, just like the mythical phoenix, his candidacy 
was endorsed by the party hierarchy, and he rose from the ashes to stage a remark-
able comeback following the 2013 legislative elections, this time around in the 
position of the 3rd personality of the state and president of the National Assembly, 
a post he held since 1992. The next section of this chapter returns to the intractable 
conclave in Mbankomo to examine the outcome of the clash between the contend-
ing lists for the 2013 municipal elections.
4.5 Investiture without consensus
The conclave to select a consensus list to run for the CPDM party in Mbankomo 
ended late at night. The day after I met a key informant who took part in the meet-
ing to find out whether the leaders of the conflicting factions finally agreed to form 
a consensus list. This informant had on previous occasions informed me that he was 
the chairman of the economic and social affairs committee of the outgoing council 
team and a close personal friend of the Mayor whose re-election bid was the subject 
of a robust challenge.
I was very keen to know what the shape of the consensus list looked like. He 
began by stating the obvious, that the meeting stretched beyond the time allotted 
and after intense negotiations both sides were still unable to reach a compromise. As 
a result the incumbent Mayor’s list of which he was a member and that supported 
by the political elite was forwarded that same night to the departmental commit-
tee in Ngoumou. At Ngoumou, the incumbent Mayor’s list was rejected for being 
incomplete.
“How is this possible…? He fumed, how can people collect a file containing docu-
ments that were complete and verified and by the time it gets to its destination it is 
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found to be incomplete? How is this possible…? You see how these people (referring 
to the central committee delegation) are rubbing us of our rights as militants of the 
CPDM. I could tell that something was fishy in the hall when he (the head of the 
central committee delegation) publicly asked both sides not to pay the caution money 
of 50,000, despite being aware that the fees for the opposition list had been paid.”8
Asked how the plot unfolded, he said a lot of underhand tactics were employed 
by their adversaries in the dying minutes of the conclave. Thus, before it was 
decided that two lists be forwarded to the departmental committee, both sides 
almost reached consensus, but discussion broke down over who would head 
such a list. When it finally arrived in Ngoumou, on examining the Mayor’s list, it 
turned out to be incomplete because some documents were missing, while those 
of his opponents were complete. Days after the deadline for submission of docu-
ments to ELECAM had passed, the missing documents were discovered on the 
grounds of a secondary school in Yaoundé several kilometres from where they 
were deposited [16].
Not everybody was aggrieved by the outcome of the investiture process in 
Mbankomo. Another informant and CPDM militant I regularly interacted with 
during my research and who described himself as a supporter of the political elite 
was not very surprised at the outcome of the conclave. He said everyone from the 
Divisional Officer, former and current Ministers and other personalities who hail 
from the area were not very fond of the outgoing Mayor and his team, but could not 
really do much to get rid of them until the appropriate moment. He described the 
Mayor as an ‘absentee landlord’ who only appears when important personalities are 
visiting town or during public events such as the installation of the DO. He equally 
accused the mayor of abandoning the day-to-day management of the council to 
some auxiliaries and other individuals who were in his private pay. For example, he 
had a personal assistant who was not a member of the council staff and this person 
was not accountable to anybody except the Mayor. According to my informant, the 
Mayor also failed to delegate responsibility to his two official deputies as required 
by law.9
5. Conclusion
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that 2018 is an important elec-
toral year in Cameroon. In line with the initial calendar, legislative, municipal, 
senatorial and presidential elections were scheduled to take place. Senatorial 
elections were held in March 2018, municipal and legislative elections were 
postponed for 1 year, and presidential elections are scheduled for October 2018. 
The official reasons for the postponement of the legislative and municipal elec-
tions was a ‘congested electoral calendar’ however, many observers believe that 
the worsening security situation in the English-speaking North-West and South-
West Regions makes it almost impossible for the conduct of elections based on 
universal suffrage. The question that therefore arises is why organise presidential 
elections which like the legislative and municipal elections that was postponed, 
are based on universal suffrage, even though, chances are the elections will not 
be effective in the two English Speaking areas of the country that are seeking to 
breakaway?
8Personal communication 07/12/2013.
9Personal communication 07/13/2013.
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That question like the issue of organising elections at a period when the country 
is embroiled in a profound crisis that is fast degenerating into a civil war remains 
contentious. However, many supporters of the governing regime argue that there 
is no clause in the electoral code that stipulates that presidential elections or indeed 
any elections must be held throughout the national territory for the results to be 
deemed legitimate. This therefore brings up another question. Why postpone the 
legislative and municipal elections and proceed with presidential elections if the 
legitimacy of the process is not affected by the prospects of elections not being 
organised throughout the country? The answer to this question not only lies in the 
intricacies of the crisis situation in the North-West and South-West Regions of the 
country, but also in the believe by the electoral authoritarian regime in Cameroon 
that its legitimacy is not necessarily based on the results of elections but on its 
manipulative skills.
The announcement of the presidential elections generated a lot of debate and 
also speculation about whether the 84 years old President who has been in power for 
36 years will run again. On the one hand, some opposition figures and civil society 
expressed the wish that the incumbent Paul Biya should not seek another 7 years 
mandate, but should instead organise free, fair transparent elections that will lead 
to a smooth transition of power. On the other hand, militants of the CPDM boasted 
that Biya is their ‘natural candidate’ and were in no doubt about the eventuality of 
him declaring his candidature before the expiration of the deadline, something he 
eventually did via twitter on Friday 13th July 2018.
In October 2018 therefore, Cameroonians will be heading to the polls to elect a 
new president. This will be exactly 26 years from the highly acrimonious 1992 presi-
dential elections. Just like on previous occasions, the opposition is heading in to 
the electoral arena in dispersed ranks which greatly reduces its chances of electoral 
success. Not wanting to leave anything to chance, the government on its part has 
embarked on the usual divide, weaken and conquer strategy.
Following internecine squabbles within three opposition parties, the Interior 
Minister issued a communique which surreptitiously declared three individuals 
that were contesting the leadership of their respective parties as the only individu-
als officially authorised to represent the said parties. Few days after the minister’s 
communique, the ‘officially recognised’ party leaders in collaboration with a horde 
of other politicians came out publicly to pledge their support for the candidacy 
of President Paul Biya. Curiously, one of the deposed party leaders who sought to 
counter the minister’s declaration was denied the authorization to organise a public 
event, and on the day of the said event, the party headquarters was surrounded by 
heavily armed policemen and soldiers bent on ensuring the event did not happen.
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